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 Abstract 
Decision makers who evaluate complex alternatives in real-world decision-making contexts are 
susceptible to cognitive biases, which can influence judgments, and may result in irrational 
decisions. Engaging in deliberate, systematic evaluation may reduce the extent to which biases 
pervade rational judgments (Kahneman, 2011). Previous studies have demonstrated that the 
deliberate consideration of multiple alternatives is an effective strategy to reduce biases (Lord, 
Lepper, & Preston, 1984). However, there is limited research on the effects of deliberate analysis 
on judgments in business decision-making. The present study examines whether the extent of 
deliberate analysis would elicit differences in the degree to which judgments changed across the 
decision-making process. Undergraduate students (N = 32) evaluated high- and low-risk 
hypothetical business scenarios involving decisions between two choice alternatives. Perceived 
behavioural intentions to pursue the decisions were assessed at two points: after reading the 
scenario, and after deliberate analysis of the pros and cons for one, or both alternatives. The 
results suggest that engaging in comparative analysis, as opposed to selective analysis of a single 
alternative, causes significantly larger changes in initial intuitive evaluations; this strategy is 
particularly effective in situations concerning high risk. The practical importance of these results 
for multifaceted business decision-making in assessed, particularly with regard to the use of 
deliberate comparative analysis as a strategy to decrease risk aversion.  
 Keywords: decision making, deliberate thought, business judgment, cognitive bias  
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 1 
Introduction 
 
In a complex social world, human beings rely extensively on decision-making and its 
underlying cognitive processes to make sense of information and decide between various 
alternatives.  Given that decision making guides our actions, and ultimately influences the 
direction of our lives, it is not surprising that this topic has received significant attention in fields 
such as cognition, neuropsychology and social psychology. Psychological research has provided 
evidence that decision-making processes can be improved through factors such as a) practice 
with a task, and b) improved abilities to evaluate the probabilities associated with various 
outcomes (Arkes, 1986; Nisbett, Krantz, Jepson, & Kunda, 1983). However, these strategies may 
not be practical in many real world decision-making contexts, such as when situations are 
complex or novel (constraining our ability to employ extensive practice), or when interacting 
situational factors are present (constraining our ability to accurately evaluate probabilities). 
These conditions, which are characteristic of the decisions individuals face in the business world, 
suggest that further exploration of alternative strategies to improve decision-making processes is 
warranted.   
Research by Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman has contributed significantly to the 
present conceptualization of cognition and decision-making. The premise of this research 
suggested that thoughts and decisions result from two interacting systems; System 1 thinking is 
automatic, rapid and driven by instinct, while System 2 thinking is deliberate, analytical, based 
on evidence, and controlled (Kahneman, 2011). System 1 thinking relies on automatic shortcuts, 
or heuristics, which facilitate the efficient processing of incoming information.  However, using 
heuristics often leads to cognitive biases, which are systematic errors in predictions and 
judgments (Kahneman, 2011). Given that automatic thinking primarily occurs outside of 
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conscious awareness, biases from System 1 can permeate deliberate thought, and may ultimately 
lead to decision-making that is not rational.  Rational decision-making (System 2) is 
characterized by decisions made following careful consideration of relevant information and an 
accurate weighing of costs relative to benefits (Milkman, Chugh, & Bazerman, 2008).  
Extensive research has furthered the work of Tversky and Kahneman, and suggested that 
cognitive biases influence decision-making. Biases lead to predictable decisions which are not 
rational, a trend that has been found in both novices and experts, and is present in every aspect of 
our lives (Lichtenstein, Slovic, Fischhoff, Layman, & Combs, 1978; Rabin, & Thaler, 2001; 
Kermer, Driver-Linn, Wilson, & Gilbert, 2006). Awareness of biases in decision-making does 
not appear to be the solution to eliminating violations of rational choice. Evidence has suggested 
that among individuals who were explicitly aware of biases, systematic errors in judgment 
persisted (Fischoff, 1982; Bazerman, & Moore, 2009). The present study accepted that biases are 
unavoidable, and instead, focused on how certain factors (such as the decision-making process 
and the level of risk associated with a decision) can influence the judgments that stem from 
automatic System 1 thought and deliberate System 2 thought.   
Risk and Uncertainty in Decision-Making Situations  
Despite the cross-domain influence of biases, important distinctions have been made 
between decisions made in business contexts versus other decision-making situations. Decision-
making studies that have investigated risk-taking propensity have predominantly used situations 
in which decision alternatives are outlined with exact probabilities of occurrence (Kahneman, & 
Tversky, 1973). In these scenarios, risk is associated with recurring events where the relative 
frequency of past outcomes is explicitly provided and can be used to predict the probability that 
certain outcomes will occur in the future. For example, decision makers in these studies are often 
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faced with a choice to pursue a gamble or to accept a riskless transaction where they are 
guaranteed a specific amount of money. For the gamble, the probability of various outcomes are 
well defined and quantitatively described, typically as monetary values (e.g., choice between an 
85% chance of winning $1,000/15% chance of winning nothing or winning a guaranteed $800, 
Khaneman, & Tversky, 1984).  
In a business context, risk is more accurately described as uncertainty, as it is the result of 
unique events where the likelihood of outcomes can only be subjectively estimated (Knight, 
1921; Macko, & Tyska, 2009). For example, one inherent risk that influences the outcome of 
business choices is the state of the economy, which is affected by complex factors such as the 
political climate, interest rates, consumer spending and capital investment. When evaluating 
choices, a decision maker can estimate – based on trends or expert reports - how the economy 
may affect their decision in the future, but this risk cannot be objectively quantified or predicted 
with certainty. Kahneman and Tversky (1984) suggested that choices based on uncertainty, such 
as whether or not to take an umbrella, must be made in the absence of advance knowledge of 
consequences, which are determined by uncertain events, such as the weather. They argued that 
deciding how to act in situations of uncertainty is comparable to accepting a gamble where 
different outcomes may occur at different probabilities (Kahneman, & Tversky, 1984). Choices 
of how to act in business situations require that decision makers accurately weigh risks and 
benefits in order to subjectively evaluate uncertainty and select the optimal alternative. Under 
these conditions, a rational evaluation of decision alternatives through controlled System 2 
thought is a necessary prerequisite for rational decisions.  
To suggest that risk taking in a gambling context, in which the decision maker has no 
control over outcomes, translates to a propensity to take risks in business is not a fair 
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comparison. Research on decision-making and risk taking in a business context must replicate 
elements characteristic of business decisions, namely, the uncertainty associated with outcomes, 
and the fact that risk does not stem from a single source. Replicating elements of naturalistic 
decision-making contexts can also enable the study of more complex decision-making and risk-
evaluation processes. For example, the deliberate analysis of alternatives is relevant to complex 
real world decision-making contexts, and represents an area of study that cannot be explored 
using the traditional decision-making and risk-taking gamble paradigms. 
Research investigating the actual decisions business people make to pursue or reject new 
product opportunities suggested that products with greater downsides and situational 
uncertainties were more likely to be rejected (More, 1982). However, in business, increased risk 
is not necessarily a negative thing, particularly if there is the potential for benefits that outweigh 
these risks, or if the risks can be mitigated. Charan (2001) suggested that failure to execute, and a 
tendency to avoid risk were significant factors that contributed to corporate underperformance. 
This suggests that an important factor to consider when evaluating judgments of decision choices 
is how likely an individual is to pursue (i.e., execute) their decision choice. One factor that may 
influence intention to execute decision choices is an individual’s willingness to take risk in a 
business context. Whether or not an individual is comfortable with risk depends on factors such 
as an individual’s self-confidence (Chen, Greene, & Crick, 1998). Additionally, a decision-
maker’s perception of the risks associated with various alternatives could be influenced by norms 
or by previous experiences in similar situations (Macko, & Tyska, 2009). These studies 
contributed to an understanding of the distinctions between chance or gambling decisions and 
business decisions; decisions concerning chance were heavily influenced by evaluations of 
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probabilities, and conversely, decisions concerning business choices were influenced by self-
perceptions and past experiences.  
Deliberate Analysis of Decision Alternatives 
 Adding to the contributions in the area of business decision-making, the current study 
attempted to explore an area that lacks sufficient evidence by examining how perceptions of risk 
and judgments of decision choices could be altered through deliberate analysis. A decision 
maker’s confidence in the decision choice and willingness to execute their choice may be 
increased by deliberate analysis. However, Kahneman (2011) suggested that people do not 
naturally engage System 2, despite the fact that deliberate thought is necessary for evaluating and 
managing risks. Research on decision-making processes structured to engage System 2 thought 
has provided evidence that this is a promising mechanism to decrease biased judgments.  
 Lord, Lepper and Preston (1984) showed that encouraging participants to consider-the-
opposite (i.e. consider evidence inconsistent with initial judgments) was an effective strategy for 
debiasing evaluations of information. Their study specifically assessed social judgments towards 
evidence for both sides of the capital punishment debate (anti vs. pro) and compared difference 
scores between initial judgments (System 1), and judgments following deliberate analysis 
(System 2). Participants were encouraged to consider the opposite sides of an argument through 
two separate strategies: some participants were explicitly instructed to consider various outcomes 
in a hypothetical scenario (the cognitive strategy was altered), while others were indirectly 
exposed to a paper with information illustrating the other side of a situation (the salience of 
information on alternate possibilities was increased). The results indicated that when explicit 
instructions were made to deliberately consider-the-opposite side of an argument, evaluations 
(i.e., how convincing evidence for both sides of the arguments was) were not influenced by 
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initial attitudes (Lord et al., 1984). These results can be interpreted according to the two types of 
thought; altering evaluation strategies by engaging System 2 to deliberately assess the pros and 
cons of both sides of an argument effectively reduced biases. This debiasing was achieved 
through decreased reliance on initial judgments (System 1) and increased reliance on System 2. 
Changes in initial evaluations, as indicated by the difference scores, suggested that final 
judgments were more rational.  
Other studies have found that consider-the-opposite strategies effectively reduced 
judgmental biases such as overconfidence in the correctness of a chosen alternative, the 
anchoring effect, and hindsight bias (Koriat, Lichtenstein, & Fischoff, 1980; Mussweiler, Strack, 
& Pfeiffer, 2000; Davies, 1992). The overarching implication of these studies is that encouraging 
decision makers to examine evidence impartially and consider the strengths and weaknesses of 
both sides of an argument is effective for decreasing biases, and thus, improving rationality, by 
causing initial judgments to change after more thorough analysis (Lord, Lepper, & Preston, 
1984). Bazerman and Moore (2009) suggested that the “consider the opposite” strategy 
effectively counteracts the confirmation bias, which is a tendency to pay attention and interpret 
information in a way that supports existing points of view, while ignoring contradictory 
information. It is important to examine whether the implications of the aforementioned studies 
extend into other domains, such as decision-making in a business context.  
Current Research 
The present study attempted to answer the following research question: is willingness to 
pursue (i.e. implement) a decision influenced by a) the extent to which a situation is deliberately 
analysed and b) the level of uncertainty or risk associated with outcomes? Ultimately, the goal of 
assessing these factors in relation to business decision making was to identify practical solutions, 
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grounded in empirical evidence, that may increase the likelihood that decisions are made based 
on a rational understanding of the situation. Previous research has suggested that in order to 
counteract a natural reliance on implicit judgments, organizations should implement checks and 
balances, such as having multiple decision makers involved in a decision (Klein, 2008; 
Kahneman, Lovallo, & Sibony, 2011). Altering the decision-making strategy may be another 
effective way to decrease reliance on initial judgments.  
The current study utilized hypothetical scenarios to describe decision-making contexts 
that were indicative of real-world business situations, characterized by uncertainty and 
multifaceted decisions. Overall, this study intended to explore how decision-makers’ judgments 
of decisions concerning different risk levels were influenced by rapid intuitive judgments, and 
how these judgments interacted to influence subsequent deliberate judgments.  
To test whether deliberate System 2 analysis can effectively decrease biased judgments, 
as reflected in changes to evaluations, the present study manipulated the decision-making 
strategy. Participants generated confirmatory pros and cons that related to the decision choice 
either in isolation, or in addition to generating disconfirmatory pros and cons that related to the 
alternate choice. This design was based on the previously reviewed studies in which judgments 
were effectively debiased when the alternative side of an argument was deliberately considered, 
and when arguments for and against initial judgments were listed (Lord et al., 1984; Griffin, 
Dunning, & Ross, 1990). Having participants list pros and cons of only their chosen alternative 
engaged System 2 to consider the alternative they had intuitively favoured, and thus the 
confirmation bias may have still pervaded final judgments. Therefore, it was hypothesized that 
judgments between the intuitive and deliberate phases would change slightly in the selective 
condition. It was hypothesized that reliance on intuitive judgments would be counteracted more 
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extensively by deliberate engagement in a comparative analysis of the risks and benefits 
associated with multiple alternatives; for the comparative analysis a greater change between 
intuitive and deliberate judgments was expected. Deliberate System 2 analysis of both 
alternatives may have decreased the likelihood that biases (which are inherent in automatic and 
intuitive thinking) permeated deliberate thought, and subsequently led to irrational decision-
making. 
Decision-makers may have engaged in System 2 thinking more extensively when the 
outcomes of multiple alternatives were analysed. Having participants list pros and cons of their 
chosen alternative and the other alternative may have increased the accessibility of the often 
neglected disconfirming evidence which is important for debiasing to occur. By deliberately 
analyzing only one alternative, there may have been a higher likelihood that confirmation bias 
impeded rational decision-making since the evidence considered was solely for the supported 
alternative. This would likely lead to a lower propensity to change initial judgments.  
Consequently, it was hypothesized that engaging System 2 thought for only one alternative may 
have caused individuals to rely more heavily on their intuitive judgments. This may have led to 
an illusion of rational decision-making in which decision-makers believed they rationally 
analysed the situation, when in fact, initial intuitive judgments were simply reaffirmed, and they 
did not actually change their initially evaluations drastically. This prediction that an illusion of 
rationality may occur is further supported by research which found that participants who 
deliberately considered one sided evidence still perceived their decision-making strategy to be 
unbiased (Lord, Ross, & Lepper, 1979; Lord, Lepper, & Preston, 1984). While both conditions 
were hypothesized to change judgments of likelihood to pursue the choice after deliberate 
judgments, the important distinction is that the decision-making strategy is more rational in the 
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comparative condition, as thorough analysis enables exploration of the entire decision choice set. 
In the selective analysis of only the intuitively favoured alternative, the illusion of rationality 
may promote a sense of rationality, despite the fact that their evaluation of the situation was not 
grounded in a rational decision-making strategy, and their initial judgments did not change 
significantly.  
Additionally, it was important to consider how the decision-making process influenced 
judgments across scenarios with different levels of risk associated with the outcomes. 
Naturalistic decision-making situations vary in terms of the magnitude of potential outcomes 
associated with choosing one course of action over another. For example, there is higher 
perceived risk if a potential decision consequence is bankruptcy, versus loss of a small number of 
customers to a competitor. Thus, the decisions that senior organizational leaders are faced with 
have associated risks and rewards which can be either large, in that they are detrimental to the 
organizations success, or small, in that they only influence a particular unit or product line. 
Investigating how judgments that resulted from intuitive and deliberate thinking differed in high- 
versus low-risk situations was important in order for findings to be generalized across decision-
making situations that concerned different levels of risk. 
 Situations with different risk levels may have changed the extent to which an individual 
relied on intuitive versus deliberate judgments to make a decision. It was hypothesized that 
individuals would be more reliant on their initial intuitive judgments when a decision concerned 
a higher perceived level of risk, and thus, would be less likely to change their initial intention to 
pursue their decision following deliberate analysis. This hypothesis was grounded in a natural 
tendency to avoid risk. It was hypothesized that in high-risk situations, more extensive deliberate 
decision-making (through a comparative analysis of outcomes) would have less of an ability to 
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elicit changes in initial intuitive judgments with regard to how likely an individual was to pursue 
their decision, as compared to situations that were associated with less risk.  
These hypotheses were based on research that suggested risks (potential losses) are more 
salient than benefits (potential gains) (Kahneman, & Tversky, 1979). Classic experiments on loss 
aversion have provided extensive support of an irrational tendency for people to avoid risk; 
losses and gains of the same dollar amount are not evaluated equally, with the former being seen 
as more aversive than the latter is attractive (Kahneman, & Tversky, 1984). This loss aversion 
tendency is also prevalent when decision makers evaluate choices to pursue an alternative option 
or maintain the status quo. In these situations, the advantages of an alternative option are 
evaluated as gains, whereas the disadvantages are evaluated as losses (Kahneman, & Tversky, 
1984). In line with the theory of loss aversion, since losses loom larger than gains, decision 
makers are biased to prefer maintaining the current status quo even if the gains and losses are of 
equal weight (Kahneman, & Tversky, 1984). Thus, in situations where the risk and potential loss 
associated with a decision was greater, it was expected that participants would be less inclined to 
pursue the alternative, and less willing to change their judgments following deliberate System 2 
analysis due to an innate tendency to perceive risk as aversive.   
Method 
Participants 
 Participants included 32 undergraduate students (20 females and 12 males) from Huron 
University College who ranged in age from 18 to 23 years (M = 19.47, SD = 1.44 years). The 
selective and comparative analysis conditions were comprised of 17 and 15 participants, 
respectively. Participants were English speakers who were not required to have any formal 
educational experience with business courses. The participants were from a variety of programs, 
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with the majority of participants (53.1%) in Psychology, 25.0% in Business and 21.9% in other 
programs. Twenty-nine of the participants were recruited online through the Huron Psychology 
SONA System, a research participant pool facilitated by the Psychology Department at Huron 
University College. These students were enrolled in an introductory psychology course at Huron 
College and compensation was provided in the form of a partial course credit to satisfy the 
laboratory component of the course. Compensation was not contingent on the completion of 
study, and was granted when an individual signed up for a time slot, arrived at the study, and 
read the consent form. Additionally, two students enrolled in a second-year course on Cognitive 
Psychology voluntarily participated, and were not compensated.   
Materials 
 The materials consisted of questions on general demographic characteristics, a role 
description, two hypothetical scenarios, questions which pertained to the perceived risks, 
rewards, rationality of decision-making and likelihood to pursue the decision, and multiple-
choice questions used for a comprehension check. Stimuli were typed and presented on a 
Windows desktop computer monitor, through the online survey software program Qualtircs. A 
standard computer mouse and keyboard were also used.  
The role description was a short passage (70-words) written by the researcher, which 
outlined the hypothetical role of a Chief Executive Office (CEO) that participants were to 
assume for both scenarios. The role description outlined that the goal of the CEO was to make 
decisions that were in the best interests of the overall company.  
Two written passages, approximately 300-words in length each, described independent 
hypothetical business scenarios that the participant (in their assumed role as CEO) was facing in 
two different organizations. The hypothetical business decision scenarios were constructed by 
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the researcher using the format of managerial scenarios created by Tyszka and Zaleskiewicz 
(2006) in a study on risk assessment in naturalistic decision situations. The scenarios described 
the overall decision to be made between two alternatives, the economic situation, current 
performance of the company, and overall risks and benefits of pursuing each of the alternatives. 
The situations were ambiguous as there were multiple risks and benefits associated with each of 
the two options. Consequently, there was no clear correct decision, as is the case in most real-
world business decisions that CEO’s are faced with.  
Specifically, Scenario 1 depicted a company that had not performed well in the previous 
year, in which the CEO was facing a decision with two alternatives: whether or not to take out a 
bank loan. The risk level for Scenario 1 was high, as one of the stated outcomes of taking out the 
loan was potential bankruptcy if the economic situation worsened. Conversely, Scenario 2 
depicted a low-risk situation, as the company was described as being in a good economic 
position.  The CEO had to decide between two alternatives: whether or not to design and create a 
new product. Thus, in both scenarios, the alternatives were related to pursing either a new course 
of action or maintaining the status quo, however, response options were specific in that they 
pertained to the decision at hand in the respective scenario. Participants were also presented with 
printed versions of the role description and two hypothetical scenarios to refer to throughout the 
study. Appendix A provides the instructions, role description and scenarios as they were 
presented to participants.  
The questions that pertained to the scenarios were used to measure participants’ intuitive 
and deliberate judgements on various dimensions related to their decisions. To measure which of 
the two alternatives the CEO should purse, two response choices per scenario were provided: 
take out a bank loan or do not take out a bank loan for Scenario 1, and design and create a new 
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product or do not design and create a new product for Scenario 2. Additional questions asked 
about how likely participants were to pursue their decision choice, what level of risk was 
associated with their decision, what level of reward was associated with their decision, and how 
rational they believed their decision was. Responses to these questions were measured on 10-
point scales with a sliding response indicator that was accurate to one decimal place. Lower 
scores indicated a lower likelihood of pursing the chosen option, or, lower levels of risk, reward, 
or rationality (1.0 = very unlikely, or, no risk, or, no reward, or, not rational at all and 10.0= very 
likely, or, substantial risk, or, substantial reward, or, very rational). 
The materials used to facilitate deliberate analysis included a question asking participants 
to list the pros and cons of their chosen alternative followed by 20 boxes for the individual pros 
and cons to be recorded. The extent of deliberate analysis was manipulated by asking 
participants in the comparative condition to list the pros and cons of both their chosen alternative 
followed by the pros and cons of the other alternative. Listing reasons for and against various 
alternatives is a means of structuring the decision-making process that has been effectively used 
in previous research studies to reduce biased judgements (Koriat, Lichtenstein, & Fischoff, 
1980). 
Six multiple-choice questions (three per scenario) with three response options per 
question were used to measure comprehension levels of the hypothetical scenarios. The specific 
questions are provided in Appendix E. The questions assessed recognition of basic facts 
presented in each scenario and, thus, were easy to answer if participants carefully read the 
scenarios. The threshold for adequate comprehension was set at four out of six correct responses.   
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Procedure 
Participants completed the study between 8 a.m. and 4 p.m. on weekdays between 
December 2016 and March 2017 in a psychology testing room at Huron University College. 
Testing was conducted individually or in groups of two to three participants, however, in all 
cases, the study was completed independently with no opportunity to interact with other 
participants. In order to ensure that participants were able to concentrate, the testing room was 
quiet and the door to the testing room was closed. Privacy screens separated each of the cubicles 
so that participants were unable to observe the screens of the other participants in the room. Pre-
scheduled session timeslots were 50-minutes each, with a total study duration of approximately 
20-minutes for the selective condition, and 30-minutes for the comparative condition. The slight 
variations in test duration in each condition were due to differences in reading speed. The study 
utilized a 2 X 2 mixed-factorial design, with one between-subjects independent variable (extent 
of rational analysis: comparative vs. selective analysis of alternatives) and one within-subjects 
independent variable (risk level: high- vs. low-risk level) Prior to commencing the study, 
participants were presented with a printed consent form that outlined the procedure.  
The online survey was pre-loaded on the computer screen prior to each testing session. 
Prior to beginning the survey, participants were provided with verbal instructions to use the 
keyboard to type their responses, and the mouse to progress through the questions in the study. 
Participants were provided with printed copies of the role description and scenarios and 
instructed that this information could be referred to when completing the study.  
After beginning the study, participants responded to demographic questions on their 
gender, age, program of study, and year of academic study. Participants were provided with 
written instructions that they would be required to answer multiple-choice questions later in the 
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study based on the content of the hypothetical scenarios. The purpose of this was to ensure that 
responses reflected a thorough understanding of the scenario details and to increase participants’ 
motivation to carefully read the material.  
Participants read the role description followed by one of the scenario descriptions. 
Schwarz, Hippler and Noelle-Neumann (1992) suggested that the order of presentation for 
questions in a survey can affect preferences since individuals tend to rely on previous judgment 
when making consequent decisions. Therefore, the order in which the two scenarios was 
presented was counter-balanced, with half of the participants receiving the low-risk scenario 
first, and half of the participants receiving the high-risk scenario first. The procedure was 
identical for both scenarios. At no point in the study could a participant go back to review or 
change previous responses. Time spent on each page, response latency and number of clicks on 
the response scale were recorded by Qualtrics experimental software, however, this data was not 
visible to participants.  
In the intuitive judgment phase, participants were presented with questions pertaining to 
their decision, including which option they thought was in the best interests of the company to 
pursue as CEO, how likely they were to pursue that decision, perceived level of risk and reward, 
and how rational they believed their decision was (see Appendix B). They were instructed to 
respond to each question as quickly as possible to ensure that responses reflected automatic 
judgments. Each page displayed a countdown timer from 15-seconds, after which point the page 
automatically proceeded to the next question. This time pressure further ensured that responses 
reflected automatic processing.  
Participants were randomly assigned to one of two conditions for the extent of rational 
analysis (selective analysis vs. comparative analysis). Participants were asked to deliberately 
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assess the pros and cons of their chosen alternative in the selective condition, or both their 
chosen alternative and the other alternative in the comparative condition (see Appendix C). The 
purpose of this exercise was to facilitate deliberate processing, thus engaging System 2. 
Participants were given 3-minutes to generate pros and cons which were typed in a list format. 
They were asked to indicate whether each response was a Pro or Con prior to typing their 
specific response. There was no requirement for how many pros and cons participants were 
required to generate. A total of 20 boxes were provided, more than could be filled in the allotted 
time. In the comparative condition, the identical procedure was repeated for the second 
alternative, thus, further engaging System 2 thought and ensuring that both alternatives were 
rationally analysed. After the 3- minutes had elapsed, participants were presented with a waiting 
screen, which displayed a countdown timer from 60-seconds. They were instructed to reflect on 
their analysis and were unable to progress to the next stage until the countdown ended. The 
waiting period was included in order to decrease the likelihood that participants in the 
comparative condition would be susceptible to the recency effect, and base their responses to the 
deliberate judgment questions on their deliberate analysis of the most recently completed 
alternative. 
In the deliberate judgment stage, participants responded to the identical questions which 
were asked in the intuitive judgment phase. There was no time limit, and participants could 
advance through the questions at their desired pace (see Appendix D).  
In the final phase, the comprehension check, the printed role description and scenarios 
were removed so that responses would reflect whether previous decisions and judgments were 
made based on an accurate understanding of the scenarios. The prior knowledge of this phase 
was intended to increase participants’ motivation to thoroughly read the information, and thus 
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enable them to effectively engage in a rational analysis of the pros and cons and respond to 
questions based on the content of the scenarios. Upon completion of the study, a debriefing 
statement was provided which outlined the purpose and hypotheses of the study.  
Results 
Preliminary Analyses 
 Participants’ responses to the comprehension check questions were assessed to ensure 
that participants adequately understood of the scenario information and risk level. No 
participants were omitted on the basis of inadequate performance, as the mean comprehension 
check score was 95.86% (SD = 10.38). 
 Prior to data analysis, the responses from the deliberate analysis phase were assessed to 
ensure that participants provided pros and cons that pertained to the scenarios; this further 
ensured that participants had carefully read and understood the descriptions. One participant was 
removed from the sample as they simply typed a list that stated pro or con, but failed to provide 
descriptions of what the pros and cons were. The researcher was unable to determine whether 
this participant had engaged in a deliberate analysis of the alternatives, and thus, a final sample 
of 32 participants was used for the purposes of data analysis. Generated pros and cons commonly 
referred to themes such as the risks or benefits associated with various fluctuations in the 
economy, the potential to pursue other endeavors if a decision proved to be successful, the 
threats or opportunities to related to customers or competitors, and the overall benefits or risks of 
the alternative under consideration. Examples of responses from this phase are provided in 
Appendix F to further demonstrate the extent to which participants deliberately analysed the 
decisions at hand. The pros and cons analysis were converted into raw scores for the number of 
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pros and cons participants associated with the alternative they thought was in the best interest of 
the company (selective and comparative groups) and the other alternative (comparative group).  
Design of Primary Analyses  
A 2 X 2 mixed-factorial analysis of variance (ANOVA) was conducted to determine 
whether there were significant differences in judgments of perceived likelihood to pursue the 
decision between the intuitive and deliberate judgment phases. The between subjects factor was 
extent of rational analysis (selective, comparative) and the within subjects factors was level of 
risk (high-risk, low-risk). The interaction was also assessed to determine whether the impact of 
comparative or selective deliberate analysis on changes in likelihood to pursue the decision 
depended on risk level.  
Scores for the dependent variable ranged from – 10 to + 10, with raw scores of judgments 
of likelihood to pursue for the status quo option (do not pursue the bank loan/do not create the 
new product) converted to negative scores and scores for pursuing the bank loan or creating the 
product kept as positive scores. The purpose of creating one scale was to enable difference scores 
to be calculated across all participants, including the three participants in the high-risk condition 
who changed their responses for which decision they favoured between the two phases (e.g., 
stated they would take out the loan in the intuitive phase and then changed it to not taking out the 
loan in the deliberate phase).  Difference scores were calculated by taking the absolute value of 
the rating for likelihood to pursue the choice in the deliberate phase minus the likelihood to 
pursue the choice in the intuitive phase. The absolute value was taken due to the fact that the 
variable of interest was the magnitude of change between evaluations, regardless of the direction 
of the judgment shift.  
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Main Effects and Interactions 
The results revealed a significant main effect for extent of rational analysis, F (1, 30) = 
4.69, p = .038, partial ƞ2 = .14 (Figure 1). Participants in the comparative condition who analysed 
pros and cons for both alternatives (M = 1.91, SE = .46) changed their judgments of the 
likelihood to purse their decisions more than those in the selective condition who analysed pros 
and cons of only one alternative (M = .54, SE = .44). There a marginally significant main effect 
for risk level, Greenhouse- Geisser adjusted F (1.00, 30.00) = 2.93, p = .09. Difference scores 
between intuitive and deliberate judgments of likelihood to pursue the decision were not 
significantly different when risk level was low (M = .66, SD = .68), as compared to risk was high 
(M = 1.70, SD = 3.72).  
There was a marginally significant interaction between level of risk and extent of rational 
analysis, F (1, 30) = 2.75, p = .10, which indicated that the impact of risk level on changes in 
likelihood to pursue the decision did not depend on the extent of rational analysis (selective vs. 
comparative).  
Multiple Linear Regressions 
 Two multiple linear regressions (high-risk scenario, low-risk scenario) were conducted to 
determine whether changes in judgments of likelihood to pursue the decision between intuitive 
and deliberate phases (the dependent variable) could be predicted by various judgments in the 
intuitive and deliberate phases. The absolute value of difference scores was used as the 
dependent variable. The predictor variables were level of risk, level of reward, perceived 
rationality, number of pros (for the choice and alternative) and number of cons (for the choice 
and alternative). Overall, neither the high- or low-risk regressions were significant when the  
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Figure 1. Line graph of mean difference scores representing judgments of likelihood to pursue 
the decision in the intuitive phase subtracted from the judgments of likelihood to pursue the 
decision in the deliberate phase for comparative and selective analysis in high- and low-risk 
scenarios.  A significant difference was found between changes in judgments for the comparative 
and selective analysis conditions. A marginally significant main effect was found for risk level, 
and a marginally significant interaction was found for risk level and extent of rational analysis.  
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predictors were taken together. The results for the high-risk regression were F (13, 1) = 67.60, p 
= .095, R2 = .999. Of the predictors investigated for the high-risk scenario, none of the predictor 
variables were significant as revealed by the results in Table 1. The overall results for the low-
risk regression were F (12, 2) = 5.89, p = .154, R2 = .97. Of the predictors investigated for the 
low-risk scenario, intuitive risk level judgments (β = - 2.18, t (2) = - 4.13, p = .054), deliberate 
reward level judgments (β = 1.98, t (2) = 4.25, p = .051) and deliberate rationality level 
judgments (β =   - 2.60, t (2) = - 4.92, p = .039) were significant. The other predictor variables 
were not significant predictors of changes in judgments for likelihood to pursue the decision. 
 A Pearson bivariate correlation revealed a negative relationship in the low-risk scenario 
between judgments of perceived rationality of decision making (in both the intuitive and 
deliberate phases) and difference scores for likelihood to pursue the decision. Specifically, there 
were significant negative relationships between perceived rationality of decision making and 
difference scores in the intuitive phase, r (13) = -.63, p = .006, and in the deliberate phase,  
r (13) = - .58, p = .012. 
Discussion 
 The results suggested that the extent of rational analysis an individual engaged in had 
significant effects on decision-making. These effects were with regard to the changes in 
perceived behavioural intentions (i.e. judgments of likelihood to pursue the decision) between 
the intuitive and deliberate phases. The mixed-factorial ANOVA revealed that individuals were 
more likely to change their judgments following deliberate analysis when they engaged in 
deliberate analysis of the risks and benefits of both alternatives compared to the selective 
analysis of only the intuitively favoured alternative. Thus, the experimental hypothesis that 
selective analysis of only one alternative would lead to less drastic changes in judgments  
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Table 1 
Regression Predicting Changes in Judgments of Likelihood to Pursue the Decision  
Model 1: Low-Risk      Model 2: High-Risk        
Predictor Variable                   B         SE           β             t  p                   B         SE                β          t           p 
Likelihood to Pursue (Intuitive) 
 
1.08 .29 8.89 3.77 .06   -1.87 .61 -.46 -3.05 .20 
Likelihood to Pursue (Deliberate) - .95 .26 -8.30 -3.73 .07 -.23 .55 -.06 -.41 .75 
Level of Risk (Intuitive) -1.20 .29 -2.18 -4.13 .05* 2.20 .42 .97 5.22 .12 
Level of Risk (Deliberate) .06 .11 .13 .58 .62 5.28 .86 2.23 6.10 .10 
Level of Reward (Intuitive) -.96 .24 -2.36 -3.97 .06 -3.13 .30 -1.56 -10.64 .06 
Level of Reward (Deliberate) .88 .21 1.98 4.25 .05* 1.22 .24 .43 5.11 .12 
Decision Rationality (Intuitive) .63 .23 .93 2.69 .12 1.25 .34 .54 3.67 .17 
Decision Rationality (Deliberate)  -1.55 .32 -2.60 -4.92 .04* 2.25 .53 .59 4.25 .15 
Number of Pros (Choice) 1.94 .52 2.91 3.70 .07 -4.32 .85 -1.30 -5.11 .12 
Number of Cons (Choice) .46 .19 .64 2.36 .14 -1.75 .22 -.62 -7.88 .08 
Number of Pros (Alternative) -.25 .24 -.20 -1.06 .40 19.37 3.73 2.23 5.19 .12 
Number of Cons (Alternative)  -.12 .21 -.15 -.58 .62 .62 .45 .18 1.38 .40 
 
Note. The predicted variable was the absolute value of difference scores for likelihood to pursue the decision; higher scores indicated a 
greater change in judgments from intuitive to deliberate phases. Scores for the predictor variables likelihood to pursue, level of risk, 
level of reward and level of decision rationality ranged from 1 to 10, with higher scores indicating greater perceived risk, reward or 
rationality.  
* p < or = .05.  
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between the intuitive and deliberate phases as compared to the comparative analysis was 
supported. These changes were in either direction (i.e. more or less likely to pursue the decision 
after deliberate analysis). The scenarios contained ambiguous information, which equated to no 
objectively correct answer. Therefore, the direction of the change was not the focus of the 
analysis; rather, the variable of interest was whether deliberate analysis could cause individuals 
to re-evaluate their initial intuitive judgments and subsequently change their judgments 
following the deliberate analysis of pros and cons.  
It was hypothesized that individuals would be more reliant on their initial intuitive 
judgments when a decision concerned a higher perceived level of risk. This would have been 
reflected in less of a change in the judgments of likelihood to pursue the decision between the 
intuitive and deliberate phases. Given that there was no significant main effect for risk level, this 
hypothesis cannot be supported. Despite the fact that the interaction between risk level and 
extent of deliberate analysis (comparative vs. selective) was not quite significant, the graphical 
representation of the results demonstrates that engaging in a comparative or selective analysis of 
the pros and cons had markedly different effects in the high-risk scenario. Specifically, 
individuals changed their initial intuitive judgments much more after they had engaged in a 
comparative analysis of the pros and cons for both alternatives.  
This finding contradicts the hypothesis that individuals would be less likely to change 
their perceived intent to pursue their decision choice when the scenario concerned a higher level 
of risk. Instead, the results actually suggested the opposite, and revealed that when a comparative 
analysis of the alternatives strategy was used, individuals changed their evaluations much more 
in the high-risk scenario. Thus, the current study adds to the extensive previous research that 
suggested comparative analysis of multiple alternatives can promote debiasing of judgments 
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(Lord, Lepper, & Preston, 1984; Koriat, Lichtenstein, & Fischoff, 1980; Mussweiler, Strack, & 
Pfeiffer, 2000; Davies, 1992) and extends this finding to decisions concerning business choices.  
The results also have valuable implications with regard to the existing research on risk aversion. 
Employing a comparative deliberate analysis strategy to evaluate a decision may help decrease 
the likelihood that individuals in organizations are influenced by implicit tendencies to be risk 
aversive. Research has suggested that risks (potential losses) are more salient than benefits 
(potential gains) and consequently, individuals are more inclined to make decisions that 
minimize risk and potential losses (Kahneman, & Tversky, 1979). The tendency be averse to 
situations of high risk may be counteracted by engaging System 2 though extensively though a 
comparative analysis. The fact that individuals were inclined to change their judgments of 
likelihood to pursue the decision after a comparative analysis of the high-risk scenario decision 
set suggests that the deliberate analysis may have resulted in a deeper understanding of the risks 
that pertained to the situation. This can be inferred by the fact that comparative deliberate 
analysis caused decision-makers in high-risk situations to more drastically change their initial 
judgments of behavioural intention to pursue the decision.  
This support for deliberate System 2 analysis that is comparative in nature has practical 
relevance for decision-makers in organizations who face high-risk decisions. Charan (2001) 
suggested that failure to execute and a tendency to avoid risk are significant factors that 
contribute to corporate underperformance. One potential way to mitigate this issue is to 
encourage comparative analysis of all the choice alternatives. This strategy appeared to be a 
useful for decreasing reliance on initial System 1 judgments and promoting individuals to 
reconsider their intuitive perceptions of a situation after System 2 was engaged. Given that high-
risk scenarios have the potential for greater loss (monetary, reputational etc.) within 
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organizations, this research has particularly valuable implications in the real world and should be 
explored in future research.  
It was hypothesized that deliberate engagement in the selective analysis of the risks and 
benefits associated with only one alternative may have caused individuals to be more susceptible 
to biases, and thus less inclined to change their intuitive intentions to pursue the decision. 
Selectively analyzing only one alternative does appear to have led to an illusion of rational 
decision-making in which decision-makers believed they rationally analysed the situation, when 
in fact, initial intuitive judgments were simply strengthened. The difference scores in the high-
risk scenario when System 2 analysis was selective were much lower than when comparative 
analysis was employed. Lord, Lepper and Preston (1984) found that when participants did not 
explicitly evaluate both sides of a situation by considering the opposite alternative, they were 
susceptible to attitude polarization such that deliberately thinking about their initial position 
caused them to strengthen their initial belief. The fact that intuitive and deliberate judgments of 
behavioural intention did not drastically change in the selective condition further supports this 
finding.  
Since the underlying decision-making process is biased when only one alternative is 
considered, deliberate analysis that pertains only to the chosen alternative could have negative 
implications as judgments could be considered irrational. The results are encouraging as they 
suggested that participants in the comparative condition who analysed pros and cons for both 
alternatives were more likely to change their intentions to pursue their decisions compared to 
those in the selective condition who analysed only their chosen alternative when risk level was 
high. The consideration of various alternatives forces an individual to assess information that is 
inconsistent with initial beliefs. This may enable decision makers in organizations to effectively 
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evaluate the risk associated with a decision choice, and consider the benefits of an alternative 
they had not intuitively favoured.  
One explanation for why considering inconsistent arguments and multiple alternatives 
can increase rationality is that these strategies increase the accessibility of commonly neglected 
information and thus, final estimates are based on a knowledge set that is unbiased, which results 
in unbiased judgments (Mussweiler, Strack, & Pfeiffer, 2000). According to this logic, the 
information base mediates the relation between deliberate analysis and debasing of judgments. 
Thus, when the decision involves a high degree of risk encouraging individuals to consider 
various alternatives in-depth, by assessing the risks and benefits associated with multiple 
alternatives, appears to facilitate final judgments that diverge from intuitive judgments. This 
research provides empirical support for the recommendations advocated in business literature 
which suggest that decision-making may be improved by deliberately analyzing various 
alternatives (Khaneman, Lovallo, & Sibony, 2011). 
Further analysis of the data revealed that with the exception of three participants in the 
high-risk condition, decisions about which alternative to pursue were consistent across time (i.e. 
in the intuitive and deliberate conditions). Interestingly, the three participants that changed their 
decision choices between the two phases were all in the comparative condition and these changes 
were for choices in the high-risk scenario. This pattern has interesting implications with regard to 
the effectiveness of using a comparative decision analysis strategy. It appears that deliberate 
analysis of both alternatives not only caused more pronounced changes in participants’ intentions 
to pursue the decision choice, but that this comparative strategy also enabled some participants to 
abandon their intuitively favoured options.  By encouraging individuals to rationally and 
systematically consider all alternatives rather than focusing analysis only on the intuitively 
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favoured alternative, the biases that emerged towards intuitive choices were overcome as 
reflected in changes in the decision choices for these three participants.   
The results obtained in the current study suggest that deliberately analyzing various 
alternatives in the decision-making process may be one mechanism through which behavioural 
intention to act on a decision choice can diverge from intuitive judgments. However, further 
research is required in this area before these results can be generalized to a real-world setting. 
The most substantial limitation of the current study is inherent in the study of business making 
decisions in a lab context; the actual situations that people in organizations face are much more 
complex.  
One critique of this study, and any study that attempts to replicate aspects of a business-
decision-making context in the lab, is whether hypothetical decision-making is as a valid 
measure of real word decisions. For example, discrepancies in compensation between the sample 
and decision-makers in the real world are evident. The current study presented university 
students with a brief description of a situation and provided them with a course credit as 
compensation. Conversely, decision-makers in businesses situations often have substantial 
monetary incentives to make good decisions (e.g., bonuses and/or salaries tied to overall 
company performance).  Despite this limitation, some empirical support has suggested that 
incentives may not necessarily alter decision-making processes. Tversky and Kahneman (1981) 
found that when they introduced a monetary incentive, in the form of payoff schedules 
associated with various alternatives, participants continued to be influenced by cognitive biases 
and make decisions that were not rational or optimal. This research suggests that the findings 
from the present study do accurately represent biases that would be carried over to decision-
making in the real world.  
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Additionally, participants in the present study cannot be compared to business decision-
makers on the basis of level of understanding of the decision-making situation. The former have 
only briefly read about a hypothetical situation while the later likely have extensive knowledge 
on the industry and organization in which they are making decisions. Arkes (1986) suggested 
that extensive practice with a task, or knowledge of a situation may decrease the likelihood that 
biases impede decision-making. Therefore, it is unclear whether business decision-makers could 
employ these types of decision-making strategies to improve decision-making outcomes, or 
whether they already deliberately analyse evidence for alternatives when facing a decision as a 
result of extensive practice with making complex decisions.  
The regression for the high-risk scenario was not significant and revealed that when taken 
together, the various predictors did not predict changes in likelihood to pursue the decision. This 
finding further emphasizes the fact that decision-making processes concerning business 
situations are inherently complex and influenced by many different factors, particularly when 
there is a high level of risk involved. Thus, the specific evaluations and number of pros and cons 
generated did not reliably predict how decision makers would differ in intuitive versus deliberate 
evaluations of likelihood to pursue their decisions.  
With regard to the low-risk regression, the significant predictors of difference scores (i.e., 
changes in likelihood to pursue the decision between the intuitive and deliberate phases) were 
intuitive risk level, deliberate reward level and deliberate rationality level. Specifically, higher 
perceived risk in the intuitive phase predicted lower difference scores. When risk level was 
intuitively perceived to be higher, individuals may have relied more on automatic intuitive risk 
perceptions to inform their final judgments and behavioural intentions. Additionally, deliberate 
reward level was a significant predictor, which suggests that higher perceived levels of reward 
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resulted in greater shifts in the difference scores. Perhaps the higher reward judgments led to the 
perception that there was more to be gained, and motivated individuals to change their initial 
intuitive judgments more extensively or vice versa. The significant coefficient for deliberate 
decision rationality suggests that greater changes in difference scores predicted lower ratings of 
perceived rationality. Individuals may have felt uncomfortable when their behavioural intentions 
in the deliberate stage diverged from the intuitive stage, and thus, they may have inferred that 
their overall decision-making process was less rational. This interpretation is in line with the 
notion that individuals prefer when their judgments are consistent across time.  
The correlational analysis for the low-risk scenario revealed significant negative 
correlations between difference scores and judgments of perceived rationality in both the 
intuitive and deliberate phases.  This result suggests that higher perceived levels of rationality 
were related to a lower tendency to change behavioural intentions between the intuitive and 
deliberate phases. These individuals may have already been confident with their decisions prior 
to the deliberate analysis. Individuals who perceived their decision to be rational after intuitive 
analysis may have been less motivated to engage in careful deliberate analysis, which would 
account for the lower changes in judgments across the decision-making phases. Conversely, 
when individuals’ perceived the intuitive decision to be less rational, they may have been more 
influenced by the deliberate pros and cons analysis, and thus, more likely to change their final 
judgments. The negative relationship between deliberate perceived rationality and the difference 
scores may suggest that after initial judgments of likelihood to pursue the decision were changed 
(resulting in higher difference scores) individuals may have perceived the overall decision-
making process as less rational. Conversely, when behavioural intentions to pursue the decision 
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were more consistent over time, and thus difference scores were lower, individuals may have 
perceived the deliberate decision to be more rational.  
The present study evaluated changes in the perceived likelihood to act on a decision, 
however one limitation is that it did not explore whether these intentions will actually translate 
into behaviour. The Theory of Planned Behaviour (Ajzen, 1991) identified that attitudes toward 
the behaviour contribute to behavioural intentions, which directly influence behaviour. Research 
on attitudes has suggested that stronger evaluative judgments are more likely to predict 
behaviours (Norman, 1975). The results of the present study do provide some evidence that 
explicit reports of behavioural intention changed when alternatives were deliberately analysed 
through comparative evaluation. Further research is required to determine whether increased 
behavioural intentions to pursue a business decision actually result in higher rates of execution.  
 Additional research is necessary in order to further support the hypothesis and 
demonstrate that decision-making strategies which rely on comparative deliberate analysis, and 
thus engage System 2 thought extensively, cause significant differences in judgments of 
perceived intention to act on decisions. Decision-making in a business context is inherently 
complex, and it is important to recognize the many factors that influence organizational 
outcomes. Coping with this complexity requires individuals to make difficult choices between 
various alternatives and necessitates that decision-makers accurately understand the outcomes 
associated with the alternatives they are considering. The present study attempted to provide 
insight into how business decisions are influenced by the cognitive processes of decision-makers 
and the levels of risk associated with such decisions. Business decisions cannot be considered in 
isolation from the human beings that confront them, and therefore these findings provide initial 
evidence in areas that have practical significance.  
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Extending previous research on decision-making to a business domain has valuable 
applications for training and developing business students and leaders to make decisions and 
effectively recognize sources of biases in the decision-making processes of others. Risk aversion 
suggests that risk is a barrier to implementation intentions for decisions. The general tendency to 
avoid risk suggests that in a decision-making context individuals may be predisposed to favour 
the status quo option in order to avoid potential losses. Khaneman, Lobollo and Sibony (2011) 
suggest that in organizations, the individuals making recommendations are susceptible to loss 
aversion which may cause them to be overly cautious and avoid risk. The present study found 
that in high-risk situations comparative deliberate analysis was particularly effective at 
promoting changes in behavioural intentions. Deliberate analysis of both alternatives may have 
encouraged a deeper understanding of the risks, and provided individuals with the opportunity to 
consider ways to mitigate risks. The measures used in the present study did not enable this to be 
assessed, however, encouraging a better understanding of risk factors is advantageous for 
organizations given that risk is a reality that organizations must cope with and manage.  
 In addition to the direct practical significance for decision makers in organizations, this 
study is relevant to individuals involved in approving and reviewing the decisions made by 
others in organizations. Business leaders who delegate decision making to others may find it 
beneficial to request that the decision-maker provides them with a list of pros and cons 
assessments for their chosen alternative and the foregone alternatives.  This would demonstrate 
that the decision maker had engaged in a comparative analysis of multiple alternatives and 
considered argument inconsistent information (i.e,, the cons for the chosen alternative). This 
would facilitate increased confidence that the decision was grounded in a rational process and 
that they did not simply recommend the option they had intuitively favoured. However, this 
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conclusion would only be valid if the documentation was from analysis completed prior to when 
the final decision was made. If pros and cons were generated after the decision, solely for the 
purposes of satisfying requirements for documentation, then this documentation would not 
effectively increase the rationality of the decision-making process.   
Alternatively, a more informal assessment of rational decision making could be 
implemented at various stages in the decision-making process. The person approving the 
decision could ask the decision-maker questions on the risks and benefits of other options, or sit 
in on preliminary decision-making meetings to determine whether various alternatives were 
being considered. This recommendation has been proposed in business literature by Khaneman, 
Lovallo and Sibony (2011) who suggested that one potential way to identify whether biases may 
have influenced decision making is to ask whether dissenting opinions were expressed by the 
members of a decision-making team and whether credible alternatives were considered.  
Overall, this research demonstrated that structuring the decision-making processes to 
engage deliberate System 2 thought may be a valuable strategy for organizations that want to 
increase decision-making effectiveness and encourage less reliance on automatic and intuitive 
judgments. By utilizing strategies that are grounded in empirical evidence, deliberate analysis 
may be used as a mechanism to facilitate rational choice, and decrease innate biases that pervade 
decision-making processes. Perhaps the most general insight provided by this research is the 
importance of encouraging decision-makers to evaluate various alternatives and to critically 
consider whether taking on risk could be a good choice, even if they were intuitively averse to 
the risky choice. Poor business decisions have potentially disastrous consequences for the health 
of a business, and society as a whole. This underscores why business leaders must promote a 
culture where open discussion is encouraged, and where individuals are willing to explore 
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various alternatives prior to making their choices. Additionally, to help decrease the likelihood 
that rational decision making will be stifled by loss aversion, leaders should create an 
environment where risk taking is encouraged and rewarded through compensation systems if the 
risk taking is based on sufficient deliberate analysis. In certain situations, the most rational 
decision choice may in fact be the riskier alternative and as long as the risks can be effectively 
mitigated, this choice is worth pursuing.  
The decisions facing individuals in organizations are inherently complex; organizations 
must focus their attention on structuring systematic decision-making process that help decision 
makers cope with this complexity. By enabling decision-makers to accurately assess the 
uncertainty associated with various alternatives, organizations can foster decisions that are more 
rational and encourage individuals to rely less on their intuitive judgments of the situation. 
Individuals within organizations need to change the way they evaluate decision choices. Rather 
than asking questions pertaining to the risks and benefits associated with the choice that is being 
recommended, there may be more to gain by asking about the risks and benefits associated with 
the alternatives that they do not intend to pursue.  
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Appendix A 
Materials: Role Description and Hypothetical Scenarios 
 
Role Description 
 
Instructions: Please carefully read the following role description. You will be asked to make 
decisions in the next phase of the study. You are to assume that you are making these decisions 
as the individual descried here. 
 
Role Description: 
You are the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of a large company. You have many years of 
experience as a successful leader. As the CEO, your job responsibility is to make decisions 
regarding all aspects of the business. You oversee and manage people in all different areas of the 
company. Your goal as CEO is to make decisions that are in the best interest of the company as a 
whole.  
 
Scenario #1: High Risk 
 
Instructions: Please read the following scenario carefully. You will need to use this information 
as you progress through the decision-making questions. You have received a printed copy to 
refer to.  
 
A good understanding of the information is important; you will be asked to answer fact related 
multiple choice questions about the information in this scenario at a later stage.  
 
Description:  
 
You are the CEO of Huron & Co., a large manufacturing company that makes cell phone 
components. Last year was not a good year for your business due to the conditions within the 
market for the cell phone industry. As you think about what you should do going forward, you 
have two options to consider: to take out a bank loan, or to not take out a bank loan.  
Your bank is willing to give you the money for a $1,000,000 loan if you choose to pursue this 
option, but you must consider the potential outcomes of your decision before you decide what to 
do.  
If you choose to take out the bank loan, and the economic situation in the industry gets worse, 
you may risk bankruptcy and be forced to go out of business since you may not be able to repay 
the loan. But, if you take out the loan and the economic situation gets better, you will earn a 
significant profit in the upcoming year to that will cover last years loss and put the company in a 
good financial position.   
 On the other hand, if you choose not to take out the bank loan and the situation gets worse, 
you will end up with an even larger loss compared to last year. However, if the situation in the 
economy gets better, you will earn money this year and it will be enough to cover the amount 
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that you lost last year but likely, no more. As the CEO, you must make a decision about whether 
or not to take out the loan. Which decision do you think is in Huron & Co’s best interest?  
Scenario #2: Low Risk 
 
Instructions: Please read the following scenario carefully. You will need to use this information 
as you progress through the decision-making questions. You have received a printed copy to 
refer to.  
 
A good understanding of the information is important; you will be asked to answer fact related 
multiple choice questions about the information in this scenario at a later stage.  
 
Description: You are the CEO of Western Inc., a large manufacturing company that makes 
sporting goods. Your design team has come to you with a new idea for a product. Your business 
has been doing well lately, and you have enough money to pay for the design and creation of this 
product, if you choose to go ahead with the idea. As you think about what you should do going 
forward, you have two options to consider: to go ahead with the design of the new product or to 
choose not to design the new product   
The total design and creation of this product would cost about $1,000,000 and you must consider 
the potential outcomes of your decision before you decide what to do.  
If you choose to not to create the product, and your competitor designs a similar product and 
starts selling it first, you will have missed out on an opportunity to make a significant amount of 
money and be known as the creator of this new product. But, if you choose not to create the 
product and later learn that your competitor went ahead with the product but customers did not 
like the product, and it did not sell well, you will have saved money that can be used to invest in 
other business opportunities.  
 On the other hand, if you choose to create the product, and you are the first to the market with 
an innovative product that customers turn out to love, you will gain considerable status as a go-to 
brand for unique products, and will make a significant amount of money. But, if you choose to 
create the product, and later learn that customers do not want this type of product, you will not 
make a lot of money on the product and will have missed out on opportunities to invest in other 
business opportunities.   
As the CEO, you must make a decision about whether or not to design and create the product. 
Which decision do you think is in Western Inc.’s best interest? Do you go ahead with the design 
and creation of the new product or to choose not to design and create the new product?  
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Appendix B 
Intuitive Judgments  
 
Intuitive Judgments: High-Risk Condition  
 
Note to reader: The following instructions and questions were completed immediately after 
participants read Scenario #1: High-Risk Condition. Each individual question was displayed on a 
separate page.  
 
Instructions: Answer each of the following questions as quickly as you can based on what you 
have just read in the scenario description. You will have a maximum of 15 seconds per question. 
When you have answered the question, you may click to progress to the next question, however 
if you do not answer within the allotted time, the page will automatically progress.  
 
When you are ready to see the first question, select below:  
 
I am ready to proceed  
 
Question 1:  
 
Which option are you more likely to pursue? Please select:  
 
Option 1: Take out the bank loan  
 
Option 2: Do not take out the bank loan  
 
Question 2:  
 
How likely are you to pursue the option that you have selected? In other words, what is the 
likelihood that you will follow through with your decision and carry out the actions required to 
implement this choice? 
 
 
Very Unlikely                  Very Likely 
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Question 3: 
 
What level of risk do you think is associated with the option you have selected? 
 
 
No Risk             Moderate Risk            Substantial Risk 
 
 
Question 4: 
 
What level of reward or benefit do you think is associated with the option you have selected? 
 
 
No Reward             Moderate Reward   
 Substantial Reward 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Question 5: 
 
How rational do you think your decision to pursue one option over the other was? 
 
 
Not Rational at All    Somewhat Rational          Very Rational 
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Appendix B Continued  
Intuitive Judgments  
 
Intuitive Judgments: Low-Risk Condition  
 
Note to reader: The following instructions and questions were completed immediately after 
participants read Scenario #2: Low-Risk Condition. Each individual question was displayed on a 
separate page.  
 
Written Instructions: Answer each of the following questions as quickly as you can based on 
what you have just read in the scenario description. You will have a maximum of 15 seconds per 
question. When you have answered the question, you may click to progress to the next question, 
however if you do not answer within the allotted time, the page will automatically progress.  
 
When you are ready to see the first question, select below:  
 
I am ready to proceed  
 
Question 1:  
Which option are you more likely to pursue? (please circle one) 
 
Option 1: Design & create the product  
 
Option 2: Do not design & do not create the product 
 
Question 2:  
 
How likely are you to pursue the option that you have selected? In other words, what is the 
likelihood that you will follow through with your decision and carry out the actions required to 
implement this choice? 
 
 
Very Unlikely                  Very Likely 
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Question 3: 
 
What level of risk do you think is associated with the option you have selected? 
 
 
No Risk             Moderate Risk            Substantial Risk 
 
 
 
Question 4: 
 
Question 4:  
 
What level of reward or benefit do you think is associated with the option you have selected? 
 
 
No Reward             Moderate Reward   
 Substantial Reward 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Question 5: 
 
How rational do you think your decision to pursue one option over the other was? 
 
 
Not Rational at All    Somewhat Rational          Very Rational 
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Appendix C 
Rational Analysis 
 
Rational Analysis: Selective Condition 
 
Note to reader: The following instructions and free response section was provide to participants 
in the rational analysis phase for the selective condition (i.e. analysis of pros and cons for only 
one alternative)  
 
Part 1 of 1: Written Instructions  
Please provide a list of the pro’s and con’s associated with the alternative that you think is in the 
best interest of the company. You will have 3 minutes.   
Please use the following format for your responses:  
"CON:--(enter response)--" or "PRO:--(enterresponse)--".  
You can list your pros and cons in any order and are not required to fill every box.  
 
Note to reader: Responses were entered in the following response format and participants were 
given 20 boxes total to list their pros and cons.  
 
 
 
Waiting Period Instructions: You will now have 1-minute to reflect. After 1-minute you will be 
asked to respond to decision making questions based on your judgments of the scenario 
following the pros and cons assessment. 
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Appendix C Continued  
Rational Analysis  
 
Rational Analysis: Comparative Condition 
 
Note to reader: The following instructions and free response sections were provided to 
participants in the rational analysis phase for the comparative condition (i.e. analysis of pros and 
cons for both alternatives). The instructions and response format for the chosen alternative is 
identical to the exercise that participants completed in the selective condition (Appendix A), 
however there is an additional section for the other alternative for participants in the comparative 
condition.  
 
Part 1 of 2: Written Instructions Chosen Alternative  
Please provide a list of the pro’s and con’s associated with the alternative that you think is in the 
best interest of the company. You will have 3 minutes.   
Please use the following format for your responses:  
"CON:--(enter response)--" or "PRO:--(enter response)--".  
You can list your pros and cons in any order and are not required to fill every box.  
 
Note to reader: Responses were entered in the following response format and participants were 
given 20 boxes total to list their pros and cons.  
 
 
 
 
Part 2 of 2: Written Instructions Other Alternative  
Please provide a list of the pro’s and con’s associated with the alternative that you think is in the 
best interest of the company. You will have 3 minutes.   
Please use the following format for your responses:  
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"CON:--(enter response)--" or "PRO:--(enter response)--".  
You can list your pros and cons in any order and are not required to fill every box.  
 
 
Waiting Period Instructions: You will now have 1-minute to reflect. After 1-minute you will be 
asked to respond to decision making questions based on your judgments of the scenario 
following the pros and cons assessment. 
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Appendix D 
Deliberate Judgments 
 
Deliberate Judgments: High-Risk Condition 
 
Note to reader: The following instructions and questions were completed in the deliberate 
condition after participants completed to the rational analysis phase (selective or comparative 
pros and cons) for Scenario #1 (high-risk) and waited for 1-minute.  
 
Instructions: Answer each of the following questions based on your analysis of the scenario 
description. There is no time limit per question. 
 
When you are ready to see the first question, select below:  
 
I am ready to proceed  
 
Question 1:  
 
Which option are you more likely to pursue? Please select:  
 
Option 1: Take out the bank loan  
 
Option 2: Do not take out the bank loan  
 
Question 2:  
 
How likely are you to pursue the option that you have selected? In other words, what is the 
likelihood that you will follow through with your decision and carry out the actions required to 
implement this choice? 
 
 
Very Unlikely                  Very Likely 
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Question 3: 
 
What level of risk do you think is associated with the option you have selected? 
 
 
No Risk             Moderate Risk            Substantial Risk 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Question 4: 
 
What level of reward or benefit do you think is associated with the option you have selected? 
 
 
 
 
 
No Reward    Moderate Reward    Substantial Reward 
 
 
Question 5: 
 
How rational do you think your decision to pursue one option over the other was? 
 
 
Not Rational at All    Somewhat Rational          Very Rational 
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Appendix D Continued  
Deliberate Judgments  
 
Deliberate Judgments: Low-Risk Condition  
 
Note to reader: The following instructions and questions were completed in the deliberate 
condition after participants completed to the rational analysis phase (selective or comparative 
pros and cons) for Scenario #2 (low risk) and waited for 1-minute.  
 
Instructions: Answer each of the following questions based on your analysis of the scenario 
description. There is no time limit per question. 
 
 
When you are ready to see the first question, select below:  
 
I am ready to proceed  
 
Question 1:  
Which option are you more likely to pursue? (please circle one) 
 
Option 1: Design & create the product  
 
Option 2: Do not design & do not create the product 
 
Question 2:  
 
How likely are you to pursue the option that you have selected? In other words, what is the 
likelihood that you will follow through with your decision and carry out the actions required to 
implement this choice? 
 
 
Very Unlikely                  Very Likely 
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Question 3: 
 
What level of risk do you think is associated with the option you have selected? 
 
 
No Risk             Moderate Risk            Substantial Risk 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Question 4:  
 
What level of reward or benefit do you think is associated with the option you have selected? 
 
 
No Reward   Moderate Reward    Substantial Reward 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Question 5: 
 
How rational do you think your decision to pursue one option over the other was? 
 
 
Not Rational at All    Somewhat Rational          Very Rational 
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Appendix E 
Comprehension Check  
 
Written Instructions: The following multiple-choice questions are intended to assess how 
thoroughly you read the scenario descriptions. The correct answer will have been explicitly 
mentioned in the scenario description.   
 
Please select the appropriate multiple choice response for the following three questions which 
pertain to Scenario #1 (Huron & Co.) 
 
1. Which of the following alternatives was not provided as an option:  
a) Option to take out a bank loan 
b) Option to take find alternate financing  
c) Option to not take out a bank loan 
 
2. The economic situation in the previous year was described as:  
a) Bad for your business 
b) Good for your business 
c) Having no impact on your business  
 
3. The worst-case outcome described in the scenario was: 
a) Loss of your job 
b) A law-suit from the bank 
c) Bankruptcy for the business  
  
Please select the appropriate response for the following three questions which pertain to Scenario 
#2 (Western Inc.): 
 
1) The product your company manufactured was: 
a) Clothing 
b) Sporting goods 
c) Carbonated beverages 
 
2) The decision was concerned with:  
a) Whether or not to create a new product 
b) Whether or not to discontinue an existing product 
c) Whether or not to sell an existing product in a new country  
 
3) Which of the following was a potential benefit described in the scenario? 
a) Making a significant amount of money 
b) Receiving an award 
c) Getting a promotion  
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Appendix F 
Examples of Pros and Cons Provided by Participants  
 
 Examples of Pros Generated Examples of Cons Generated 
Scenario 1 (High Risk) 
 
Decision: Take out Loan 
 
 
 
“The loan may help the 
company get through a 
difficult period” 
 
“Having money to support the 
company may decrease 
employees fears of job loss or 
pay cuts” 
 
 
“No control over what the 
market does” 
 
“Run the risk of bankruptcy” 
Scenario 1 (High Risk) 
 
Decision: Do Not take out 
Loan 
 
 
“Eliminates the possibility of 
bankruptcy” 
 
“You will not owe the bank 
money for the loan and the 
interest charges” 
 
 
“Less likely to make profit” 
 
“Less money to use to stay 
ahead of the competition” 
Scenario 2 (Low Risk) 
 
Decision: Design and Create 
Product 
 
 
“Company is already doing 
well, so they are able to take 
more risk” 
 
“It may give them an 
advantage over their 
competitors” 
 
 
“Customers could end up not 
liking the product, making 
them loose profits” 
 
“Sales are unpredictable and 
may not be good for the 
product”  
Scenario 1 (Low Risk) 
 
Decision: Do not Design and 
Create Product  
 
 
“Will have money to invest in 
other ideas that may be better” 
 
“This is the safer bet” 
 
“We wont be seen as an 
innovative company” 
 
“A competitor might make 
this product and do well” 
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